We test whether early Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid expansions in Connecticut (CT), Minnesota (MN), California (CA), and the District of Columbia (DC) affected SSI applications, SSI and DI awards, and the number of SSI and DI beneficiaries. We use a difference-indifference (DD) approach, comparing SSI/DI outcomes pre and post each early Medicaid expansion ("Early Expanders") to SSI/DI outcomes in states that expanded Medicaid in January 2014 ("Later Expanders"). We also use a synthetic control approach, in which we examine SSI/ DI outcomes before and after the Medicaid expansion in each Early Expander state, utilizing a weighted combination of Later Expanders as a comparison group. In CT, the Medicaid expansion is associated a statistically significant, 7 percent reduction in SSI beneficiaries; this finding is consistent across the DD and synthetic control methods. For DC, MN and CA, we do not find consistent evidence that the Medicaid expansions affected disability-related outcomes.
Introduction
The United States has an employment-based health insurance system for the working-age population, and this system has both advantages and disadvantages for people with disabilities (Gruber, 2000) . The main advantage is the pooling of risks, as employers have the potential to bring together large groups of people for reasons unrelated to their health status. This pooling of risks reduces adverse selection and spreads administrative costs over large groups, lowering the price of insurance (Gruber & Madrian, 1993) . This is important for individuals with disabilities who are employed and have access to employer-sponsored health insurance. One disadvantage of an employment-based system, however, is that individuals with disabilities who cannot work full-time may not have access to private health insurance through an employer. These individuals also are likely to face cost-related barriers and, until recently, were likely to encounter waiting periods and preexisting conditions exclusions in purchasing private insurance directly from an insurance company. Even when affordable private insurance plans are available, these plans typically have not covered all the services that disabled individuals need, such as therapy and long-term care (The Arc, 2012; Peele et al., 2002). For these reasons, some disabled individuals may turn to the federal disability programs --Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) -not just for the income support these programs provide but also because these programs are linked to public health insurance eligibility.
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) addressed some of the structural barriers that disabled individuals face in obtaining insurance coverage. In the private insurance market, the ACA built on prior state and federal reforms by eliminating insurance waiting periods and denials of coverage for preexisting conditions; banning annual and lifetime dollar limits on benefits; and making it illegal for insurance companies to rescind insurance coverage when a beneficiary becomes ill (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012). The ACA's Health Insurance Marketplaces also are expected to offer more affordable and comprehensive private coverage options for people with disabilities compared to what was available previously (The Arc, 2012).
In the public health insurance market, the ACA was intended to broaden Medicaid eligibility to include all adults with incomes below 138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) by January 2014.
Although this policy was not targeted at disabled adults specifically, it may have opened an important new avenue to accessing public insurance among low-income, childless, disabled adults, most of whom previously had no access to public health insurance programs other than through SSI and DI. This is particularly true in states that previously had Medicaid programs with low income-eligibility thresholds, and Medicaid programs that did not cover any childless adults (Kennedy & Blodgett, 2014) . In previous Medicaid expansions that targeted low-income, childless adults, the newly covered beneficiaries tended to resemble the SSI population in the sense that they had high levels of health needs, including high rates of behavioral health disorders (Somers et al., 2010) . Thus, it is likely that the ACA's recent Medicaid expansions, while not specifically targeted at individuals with disabilities, will tend to attract a large number of new beneficiaries who have debilitating and chronic health conditions.
If Medicaid expansions open up a new pathway to public insurance for disabled adults, then these expansions may be expected to reduce SSI and DI caseloads, if obtaining public insurance was a primary motivation for some individuals to apply for disability benefits. Similarly, if Medicaid expansions improve health among disabled adults, these individuals may be more likely to be able to continue working and stay off or exit the federal disability programs. On the other hand, Medicaid expansions may reduce insurance-motivated employment lock, encouraging some currently employed workers to leave their jobs and apply for disability assistance, since they now potentially could be covered by Medicaid until their eligibility for public insurance through the disability programs becomes effective (this waiting period is discussed further in the next section). Also, if low-income people with high levels of health need tend to migrate to or avoid moving away from states that expanded Medicaid, this increase in the low-income, relatively unhealthy population is likely to induce an increase in the numbers of both SSI and DI recipients. Because of these potentially counter-veiling effects, the net effect of Medicaid expansions on receipt of federal disability benefits remains an empirical question.
In this paper, we test whether the early Medicaid expansions in Connecticut (CT), Minnesota (MN), California (CA), and the District of Columbia (DC) have affected SSI applications, SSI and DI awards, and the number of SSI and DI beneficiaries. We begin by using a difference-in-difference (DD) approach, comparing SSI/DI outcomes pre and post the early Medicaid expansions in CT, MN, CA and DC ("Early Expanders") to SSI/DI outcomes in states that expanded Medicaid later, in January 2014 ("Later Expanders"). We also use DD methods to examine the hypothesized mechanisms linking Medicaid expansions to SSI/DI outcomes -insurance status, health, population growth, and net migration of childless, low-income individuals. We find, however, that the critical assumption of parallel trends in the pre-policy period, which underlies the DD method, is not reasonable for some outcomes. Thus, we move to a synthetic control approach, in which we examine SSI/DI outcomes before and after the ACA Medicaid expansion in each Early Expander state, utilizing a weighted combination of Later Expander states as a comparison group.
In CT, we find that the Medicaid expansion is associated with a statistically significant, 7 percent reduction in the percent of the population receiving SSI benefits; this finding is consistent across the DD and synthetic control methods. The DD model findings also indicate that CT's Medicaid expansion reduced SSI awards, and reduced DI awards and recipients, but these effects are no longer statistically significant when we apply the synthetic control approach. For CA and MN, although our DD model results suggest that the Medicaid expansion reduced some SSI/DI-related outcomes, the synthetic control findings show little evidence that the early Medicaid expansions are associated with disability applications, awards, or recipients. Finally, in DC, the DD models suggest the Medicaid expansion increased SSI awards and recipients, but these findings do not persist in the synthetic control estimates.
The DD models indicate that the Medicaid expansion was associated with increased net migration of low-income, childless adults into CT and DC, but only in the year the expansion went into effect. Overall, then, aside from the Medicaid expansion in CT which appears to have reduced the number of SSI beneficiaries, this study does not support the idea that early Medicaid expansions affected the propensity of the targeted individuals to apply for, enter, or leave the federal disability programs.
Background
Medicaid is a joint federal and state-funded public health insurance program that, until recently, primarily covered low-income children, parents, and elderly people, as well as some disabled and blind individuals. The ACA provided federal funding for states to expand Medicaid to adults with incomes The ACA Medicaid expansions, however, also may have important effects on the number of people applying for and receiving benefits from the federal disability programs, SSI and DI. Before the ACA was passed, one main route through which low-income, disabled adults could access public health insurance was through the SSI and DI programs. 1 The SSI program provides cash benefits for individuals who are low-income and have a work-limiting disability. the two programs share the same application, and Medicaid eligibility starts in the same month as SSI eligibility. In 7 other states, the SSI and Medicaid programs have the same eligibility criteria, but have separate application processes. 2 In the remaining 11 states, the Medicaid eligibility rules and application process differ from that of the SSI program (Social Security Administration, 2016a). 3 The DI program provides cash benefits and access to Medicare, after a 2 year waiting period, for disabled individuals with adequate work history. The program is funded through payroll taxes.
Benefits are based on the worker's earnings history and may be paid to workers and their dependents. (Finkelstein et al. 2012) ; if these types of effects on health are substantial, they could lead to reductions in federal disability caseloads.
On the other hand, the Medicaid expansions may reduce "employment lock" or the tendency for individuals to stay in jobs that would leave otherwise in order to maintain employer-sponsored health insurance coverage. Through this route, Medicaid expansions may increase participation in DI due to its potential to cover DI applicants during the two-year waiting period in which they no longer have employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) but do not yet qualify for Medicare (Gruber & Kubik, 2002 Medicaid expansion was associated with an increase in Medicaid coverage. We build on these studies by examining effects on a different set of outcomes -federal disability outcomes -and by using synthetic control methods, which perform better than difference-in-difference methods in our case.
Methods
Following most previous research, we start with a difference-in-difference (DD) approach to estimate the effects of early Medicaid expansions on federal disability outcomes. We consider the treatment group to be each of the four states that expanded Medicaid early (CT, MN, DC and CA -"Early Expanders") and the comparison group to be the fifteen states that expanded Medicaid on January 1, 2014 ("Later Expanders"). 4 The general specification is shown in Equation 1. In Equation 1, the dependent variable, y st , is a federal disability outcome measured in state s in year t (e.g., percent
receiving SSI benefits). The independent variables include: an indicator of whether the state expanded Medicaid early ("Early Expander"); an interaction between Early Expander and the year in which the policy was enacted ("Enact"); an interaction between Early Expander and all years after the year of enactment ("Implement"); a set of state-specific time-varying characteristics (X st ); a set of year dummy variables; and state fixed effects. We consider each Early Expander state in a separate DD model, given the diversity in the early Medicaid expansions across the four Early Expander states. In Equation 1, captures the average impact of the Medicaid expansion in a particular Early Expander state on federal disability outcomes since the expansion was implemented, while reflects the anticipatory and firstyear effects of the policy change on outcomes.
The advantage of the DD approach is that we can make a clean comparison, examining pre-post which includes a set of interaction terms between Year and Early Expander. The specification is:
where is the outcome variable for state in year ; is a dummy that turns on for a treated state j years after the treatment (negative if before); are state level controls; are state fixed effects; are year fixed effects.; and is the error term. As we show below, these models indicate that in some cases, trends did vary between each Early Expander and Later Expanders in the years before the Medicaid expansion was enacted. For some outcomes, therefore, these findings do not support the assumption of similar trends in federal disability outcomes between Early Expanders vs. Later
Expanders in the absence of the policy change.
For this reason, our main methodological approach in the paper is the synthetic control method. (2015) recommend that the donor pool be restricted to units with characteristics similar to those of the treated unit, and also to units that have not experienced a similar intervention as the treated unit. In this spirit, we limit the donor pool to Later Expander states, the 15
states that expanded Medicaid on January 1, 2014. 5 We exclude from the donor pool the states that had earlier, extensive reforms, 6 as well as states that either expanded Medicaid after January 1 2014, 7 or have chosen not to expand Medicaid.
characteristics of the treated unit, and X 0 is a (k x J) matrix containing these same characteristics for the donor pool, then the optimal synthetic control W* is the value of W that minimizes:
In comparing the outcome in the treated unit (which was exposed to the policy intervention) to the synthetic control (not exposed to the policy intervention) during the post-intervention period.
Inference in the context of synthetic control methods has been conducted using falsification tests. The underlying idea is that, if we find, for example, what seems to be a large effect of the Medicaid expansion on a federal disability outcome in an Early Expander state, we would have more confidence in this result if this effect still appeared large compared to what we find when we use each of the Later Expander states as an Early Expander state in a synthetic control falsification exercise. In 10 We use the synth command in STATA 13 to implement the synthetic control method. The default option in synth uses a constrained quadratic programming method to find the optimal W conditional on a regression-based υ matrix. There also is a nested option in STATA 13 which optimizes over all possible sets of υ and W for the best synthetic control. However, the nested method did not work well for some states in this analysis. If we use the nested approach, for states with the largest DI/SSI rates, we cannot find a synthetic control state, because the optimization algorithm reaches a flat area and the STATA program ends with an error. If we delete the state that led to the error, we will have the same error message for another state (likely the one has the second largest DI/SSI rate).
other words, we would only have confidence in a finding if the true effect were large relative to the distribution of false effects generated from falsely assigning each of the Later Expander states as a treatment state. Surveillance System. Table 2 shows DD estimates for the SSI outcomes (Panel A) and for the DI outcomes (Panel B).
Results

Difference-in-Difference Findings for Disability Outcomes and Mechanisms
For the SSI outcomes, there is a consistent pattern of findings for CT and CA. In these two states, the ACA Medicaid expansion is associated with a decline in SSI applications, awards, and recipients. This association is not consistently statistically significant, however, for any of the SSI outcomes except SSI recipients. In CT and CA, the early Medicaid expansion is associated with 0.11 and 0.28 percentage point, post-policy reductions in the percent of the state receiving SSI, respectively, which represent about 7 and 11 percent declines relative to the pre-policy period means. Notably, the magnitudes of these findings are similar to what Burns & Dague (2016) report for SSI receipt (a 7 percent reduction, based on DD methods), although these authors focus on a broader set of Medicaid expansions, and they are able to limit their sample to childless adults (which we cannot do for the disability outcomes).
In MN, the association between the Medicaid expansion and SSI outcomes is negative in sign in all but one model, but not significantly different from zero (Panel A, Table 2 ). In DC, in contrast to the results for the other three states, the ACA Medicaid expansion is positively associated with SSI applications, awards, and recipients, and these associations are statistically significant for awards and recipients (Panel A, Table 2 ). The expansion in DC is associated with a 0.18 percentage point increase in SSI awards, a 34 percent increase at the pre-policy mean, and a 0.43 increase in SSI recipients, a 13 percent increase at the pre-policy mean (Panel A, Table 2 ).
Panel B of Table 2 shows the DD results for the DI outcomes. In CT, CA, and MN, the ACA Medicaid expansion is negatively associated with DI awards and recipients, and these effects are statistically significant in most cases. The Medicaid expansion is associated with reductions in DI recipients in the post-policy period of 9-16 percent, evaluated at the pre-policy means. In DC, as was the case with SSI outcomes, we see a different pattern of findings. There appears to be no consistent association between Medicaid expansion and DI outcomes in DC (Panel B, Table 2 ).
The reduction in disability recipients in CT, CA, and MN may come about because now lowincome disabled individuals can access public health insurance without receiving SSI benefits or perhaps because having access to Medicaid improves health enough to continue working. On the other hand, in DC, the Medicaid expansion may have increased SSI awards and recipients because the expansion changed migration patterns, attracting a more disabled population. In Table 3 , we examine the plausibility of these mechanisms. Panels A-C in Table 3 show findings from DD models of insurance outcomes among low-income, childless adults (percent uninsured, percent with ESHI, percent with Medicaid) while Panels D and E show results from models of overall health among adults aged 18
and over (Panel D) and models of population growth among adults aged 18-64 (Panel E). In Panel F in Table 3 , we show findings from a model of net migration of low-income, childless adults specifically.
Each column in Table 3 shows models for a particular state -CT, DC, CA or MN.
In CT, the Medicaid expansion was associated with a 5 percentage point increase in the probability of having Medicaid, a 1 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of being uninsured, and a 2 percentage point decrease in the probability of having ESHI, among low-income, childless adults (Table 3 , Panels A-C). This is consistent with the hypothesized impact of a Medicaid expansion (increased Medicaid participation, and crowd-out of ESHI), although the effect on un-insurance is not statistically significant (Table 3 , Panel A). There is no apparent effect of the Medicaid expansion on the probability of being in fair or poor health in CT, although this regression is not limited to low-income childless adults, and the health measure is somewhat crude (Table 3 , Panel D). Nevertheless, based on this limited health measure, we do not find any evidence that improved health is the mechanism leading from the Medicaid expansion to the decline in SSI recipients in CT. The results in Table 3 do not show an association between the Medicaid expansion and population growth in CT. The findings do suggest, however, that in 2010, the year in which the Medicaid expansion went into effect in CT, there was an increase in net migration of low-income, childless adults into CT (Panel F, Table 3 ).
In DC, we see a similar, intuitive pattern of effects of the Medicaid expansion on insurance outcomes among low-income, childless adults (a reduction in ESHI and un-insurance, and an increase in Medicaid), but only one of these associations (percent with ESHI) is statistically significant (Table 3 , Panels A-C). There is no statistically significant association between the Medicaid expansion and overall health or population growth in DC (Table 3 , Panels D and E). As we saw in CT, however, the Medicaid expansion in DC is associated with increased migration of low-income, childless adults in 2010 into DC, the year in which the expansion became effective in DC (Table 3 , Panel F).
In CA, while most estimated coefficients are intuitive in sign, none of the estimated associations between the Medicaid expansion and insurance outcomes, or overall health, are statistically different from zero. The Medicaid expansion is associated with an increase in population growth (Panel E, Table 3 ), which may have affected our findings since the disability outcome variables are measured in percentages, and population is the denominator. Nevertheless, the Medicaid expansion is not associated with net migration of low-income, childless adults into CA (Panel F, Table 3 ).
Finally, in MN, the descriptive pattern of findings for insurance outcomes among low-income, childless adults is intuitive, but the only finding that is statistically significant is that the Medicaid expansion is associated with about a 1 percentage point increase in Medicaid coverage. The Medicaid expansion is associated with a statistically significant increase in population growth in MN, but, perversely, the expansion is also associated with a statistically significant decline in net migration of low-income, childless adults into MN (Panel F, Table 3 ).
In sum, the pattern of DD findings in Tables 2 and 3 suggests that early Medicaid expansions are associated with reductions in the number of SSI and DI recipients in CT and CA. In MN, the Medicaid expansion was associated with reductions in DI, but had no association with SSI outcomes. In contrast, in DC, the expansion was associated with increases in SSI awards and recipients (which may stem from changes in migration patterns induced by the expansion), and no effect on DI outcomes.
When we examine pre-period trends in these outcomes between each treated state vs. the control states, however, these trends cast some doubt on the validity of the DD approach. These pre and post trends for each of the five outcome variables for each treatment state (CT, CA, DC, and MN) vs.
the control states are shown in Appendix Figures 1-5 . In some cases, these figures show differences in trends in outcomes in the pre-policy time period. For example, in DC, there is an upward trend in all SSI outcomes relative to control states prior to the Medicaid expansion, and generally, there is the most noise in the data from DC (Appendix Figures 1-5 ). On the other hand, the SSI recipients and DI recipients outcomes are fairly stable in all states but DC, and the pre-period trend appears very similar to that of the comparison group, at least for MN and CA, and possibly also for CT (Appendix Figures 3   and 5 ). For the mechanisms (insurance coverage, overall health, and population growth), we also see that the pre-period trend is very similar in the treated state vs. the comparison states for some outcomes and states, but not for other outcomes and states (results available upon request). If pre-period trends differ between each treatment state and its controls, the parallel trends assumption underlying the DD method is suspect. Thus, we interpret the DD findings with caution, and move to the synthetic control method.
Synthetic control findings
First, we examine the synthetic control weights generated for each outcome and each treatment state. Table 4 shows the weights generated for every outcome for CT. The weights for the five outcomes for the other three states are shown in Appendix Table   4 , we see that for the SSI applications outcome in CT, a combination of MD, NJ and WV is the optimal comparison state based on how well the pre-period trend in SSI applications can be reproduced. All other states receive zero weight for this outcome. For the other outcomes in CT, the synthetic control is different in each case, but in general, NJ is a state that is weighted heavily for all outcomes. As can be seen in Table 4 and in Appendix Tables 1-3 , for all states and all outcomes, there are only a few states that comprise each synthetic control, with all other states in the donor pool receiving zero weight. In one case (the DI recipients outcome for CA), only one state is used as the synthetic control (MD in this case). trends in the synthetic controls match the trends in the treated states fairly well, but there is considerable variation across states and outcomes. In general, the match between the synthetic control and the treated state is better when there is less yearly volatility in the data. For the SSI applications and SSI awards outcomes, for example, the pre-period match is worse for DC than for CT, CA and MN because the rates move around more from year to year in DC (Figures 1 and 2 ). For the SSI recipient outcome, the preperiod match between the synthetic control and the treated state is very good for all states, and especially for CT since the data are quite stable in the pre-policy period (Figure 3 ). For the DI award outcome, the quality of the year-by-year match between the synthetic control and the treated state in the pre-period does not appear to be good for CA (Figure 4 ), but it is almost a perfect match for the DI recipient outcome in MN ( Figure 5 ). clear that the synthetic control substantially improves the matching on the average pre-period characteristics of CT, particularly matching on the outcome variable in the pre-period which is weighted heavily due to its importance as a predictor. In fact, in the case of CT, the match on the average characteristics in the pre-policy period is excellent for all of the characteristics that we consider.
Appendix Tables 4, 5 , and 6 show the same information for DC (Appendix Table 4 ), CA (Appendix Table 5 ), and MN (Appendix Table 6 ). For DC, the matching on the average of each disability outcome variable in the pre-policy time period was excellent, with the synthetic control matched almost perfectly with DC on this characteristic. The match on the "percent with a college degree" and the "percent living in poverty" was not as good, since DC has an unusual combination of a highly educated population but a relatively large fraction of the population living in poverty (Appendix Table 4 ). For CA (Appendix Table 5 ) and MN (Appendix Table 6 ), the match between the synthetic control and the treated state was excellent for all characteristics measured in the pre-period. Thus, from Table 5 and Appendix Tables 4-6 , we conclude that the synthetic control method's matching on average characteristics in the pre-period worked very well for CT, CA, and MN, and was somewhat less successful in DC for characteristics other than the outcome variables.
The synthetic control estimate of the effect of the Medicaid expansion on each outcome is the average difference between the synthetic control and the treatment state for each outcome during the post-policy period. This can be viewed graphically by turning back to Figures 1-5 . Across these five figures, we see the most consistent pattern for CT. In every figure for CT, there is a decline in the outcome in CT relative to the synthetic control during the post policy period, suggesting that the Medicaid expansion is associated with reductions in SSI applications, SSI and DI awards, and SSI and DI recipients. This is quite consistent with the pattern of DD findings for CT in Table 2 .
For the other three treatment states, the patterns in Figures 1-5 are more mixed. In CA, as we saw in CT, there appears to be a reduction in SSI recipients, DI awards and DI recipients relative to the synthetic control during the post-policy period (Figures 3-5 ). In CA, however, the synthetic control does not match the true CA well for DI awards and DI recipients during the pre-policy period, making it hard to draw conclusions about the effect of the Medicaid expansion (Figures 4-5) . In MN, the trends in all of the SSI outcomes lie slightly above the synthetic control after Medicaid expansion, suggesting the Medicaid expansion increases SSI applications and caseloads (Figures 1-3) . We only see, however, a tiny increase of DI recipients in MN ( Figure 5 ). Table 6 summarizes synthetic control findings for all outcomes and states. The table displays the average of the difference in the mean outcome between each treated state and its synthetic counterpart during the entire post-policy period. The p-value reported in Table 6 is generated based on results from the falsification tests involving each state in the donor pool; it is the number of states with a MPSE at least as high as the treated state (plus one) divided by 16, which is the number of states in the donor pool (15) plus the treated state.
Column 1 in Table 6 summarizes findings for CT. In CT, the Medicaid expansion in 2010 is associated with declines in all disability outcomes -the expansion is associated with a marginally statistically significant, 0.11 percentage point reduction in SSI recipients, which is a 7 percent reduction at the pre-expansion mean. This estimate is the same as what we found using DD methods -a statistically significant, 0.11 reduction in SSI recipients (Table 2) . 13 Also, this magnitude is the same as what Burns & Dague (2016) report for SSI receipt (a 7 percent reduction), although these authors focus on a broader and different set of Medicaid expansions. Based on the synthetic control method, the association between the Medicaid expansion and the other disability outcomes are not statistically significant at conventional levels in CT.
In Column 2 of Table 6 , we show the same set of findings for DC. In DC, none of the synthetic control findings are statistically significant, and the signs of the effects are inconsistent. In Figures 2   and 3 , there is an increase in SSI awards and recipients in DC relative to its synthetic control during the post-policy period; these effects were statistically significant in the DD models in Table 2 . In Column 2 of Table 6 , these associations are positive and large in magnitude, but not statistically significant. The pattern of findings may suggest that the Medicaid expansion attracted low-income migrants from other states who qualified for SSI, as we saw in the DD models in Panel F of Table 3 .
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 6 summarize synthetic control findings for CA (Column 3) and MN (Column 4). In CA, we observe that the Medicaid expansion is associated with about a 20 percent reduction in DI receipt, and a 6 percent reduction in SSI receipt. These synthetic control estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels; however, these magnitudes are similar to the DD estimates for CA in Table 2 , which were statistically significant.
Finally, in MN (Column 4 in Table 6 ), we see a mixed pattern of synthetic control findings.
The expansion has a positive association with all SSI outcomes, and a positive association with DI recipients, but a negative association with DI awards. None of these effects, however, are statistically different from zero, even though the positive association between the Medicaid expansion and SSI recipients is large in magnitude (representing a 16 percent increase at the pre-policy mean). 13 The MSPE ratio for CT vs. the MSPE ratio for every state in the donor pool when it is treated as "fake" treatment state is shown in Appendix Figure 6 . North Dakota may have a high MSPE ratio because the Medicaid expansion in CT took place at the same time when population changes were taking place in North Dakota due to the oil boom.
We attempted to apply synthetic control methods to the models of insurance outcomes, population growth, and net migration. However, the synthetic control methods did not work well for these mechanism variables, with the exception of total population growth. This is because the year to year variation due to measurement error was large for these survey averages. Moreover, the insurance data start in 2008, giving us only a very short pre-policy time period.
Discussion and Conclusions
As of December 2014, about 9 million disabled workers received DI benefits, costing about $142 billion in DI benefit payments, and about 8 million individuals received SSI benefits, costing about $55 billion in SSI benefit payments (Social Security Administration, 2016b). Since the early 1970's, the number of SSI recipients has more than doubled, and the percentage of working-age individuals receiving DI benefits based on their own disability and earnings history has more than tripled (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2014; CBO, 2016). In addition, the composition of the SSI population has shifted over the last three decades, from being comprised primarily of low-income, elderly people to including a larger proportion of younger people with disabilities, particularly psychiatric disabilities (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2014). Given the size, cost, and changing composition of the federal disability caseloads, there has been concern that many disabled individuals who could work instead seek disability benefits to gain access to public health insurance. The early Medicaid expansions in CT, DC, CA and MN allow us to test whether broader access to Medicaid is associated with applications for, awards for, and receipt of federal disability benefits. If access to Medicaid is an important motivation for disability enrollment, one would expect that expanding Medicaid would reduce disability caseloads. Since there are other potential pathways linking Medicaid expansions to disability receipt, however, the relationship between broader Medicaid eligibility and federal disability caseloads is not clear-cut.
Most previous researchers have used DD methods to examine the effects of Medicaid expansions. When we apply DD methods, we have a consistent pattern of findings for CT, CA, and MN -in these three states, Medicaid expansions are associated with reductions in DI and SSI receipt. In DC, the DD findings suggest that the Medicaid expansions are associated with an increase in SSI receipt.
This finding may be explained by migration of low-income, childless adults to DC induced by the expansion. Inspection of pre-period trends in outcomes, however, casts some doubt on the credibility of the DD approach. In many cases, there are pre-policy differences between the treated state and the comparison group in trends in the outcome variables. Medicaid are not explicitly linked in CT, this change may have induced some disabled, low-income individuals to continue working or resume working, reducing their need for disability benefits. The mechanisms underlying this shift are hard to capture using secondary data. Our findings do show that the Medicaid expansion in CT was associated with an increase in Medicaid participation among lowincome childless adults. We find no effects, however, of the CT Medicaid expansion on health, but our health measure is crude, and the sample for this analysis is not limited specifically to low-income, childless adults.
The main lesson we can draw from these findings is that the effects of Medicaid expansions on federal disability outcomes are likely to be heterogeneous across states. Also, we emphasize that the early Medicaid expansions that we study differ from those that have taken place more recently, suggesting that effects on federal disability outcomes may be different as well. The more recent ACA 
